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ABSTRACT
Active inference is a normative framework for generating behaviour based upon the free energy
principle, a global theory of self-organisation. This framework has been successfully used to solve
reinforcement learning and stochastic control problems, yet, the formal relation between active infer-
ence and reward maximisation has not been fully explicated. In this paper, we consider the relation
between active inference and dynamic programming under the Bellman equation, which underlies
many approaches to reinforcement learning and control. Our contribution shows that, on finite-
horizon partially observed Markov decision processes, dynamic programming is a limiting case of
active inference. In active inference, agents select actions in order to maximise expected free energy.
In the absence of ambiguity about the latent causes of outcomes, this reduces to matching a target
distribution encoding the agent’s preferences. When these target states correspond to rewarding
states, this minimises risk or maximises expected reward, as in reinforcement learning. When states
are partially observed or ambiguous, an active inference agent will choose the action that minimises
both risk and ambiguity. This allows active inference agents to supplement their reward maximis-
ing (or exploitative) behaviour with novelty-seeking (or exploratory) behaviour. This speaks to the
unifying potential of active inference, as the functional optimised during action selection subsumes
many important quantities used in decision-making in the physical, engineering, and life sciences.
Keywords: active inference, reward maximisation, reinforcement learning, approximate Bayesian inference, stochas-
tic optimal control.
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1 Introduction
Active inference is a normative framework for explaining behaviour under the free energy principle – a global theory
of self-organisation in the neurosciences [1–4] – by assuming that the brain performs approximate Bayesian infer-
ence [5–8]. Within the active inference framework, there is a collection of belief updating schemes or algorithms
for modeling perception, learning, and behavior in the context of both continuous and discrete state spaces [9, 10].
Within each scheme, active inference treats agents as systems that self-organise to some (non-equilibrium) steady-
state [11,12]; that is, an active inference agent acts upon the world so that its predicted states match a target distribution
encoding its characteristic or preferred states. Building active inference agents requires: 1) equipping the agent with
a (generative) model of the environment, 2) fitting the model to observations through approximate Bayesian inference
by minimising variational free energy [6–8,13] and 3) selecting actions that minimise expected free energy, a quantity
that that can be decomposed into risk (i.e., the expected deviation between predicted and preferred states) and infor-
mation gain, leading to context-specific combinations of exploratory and exploitative behaviour [2, 14]. Exploitative
behaviour ensures that predicted states match preferred states in a probabilistic sense or in the sense of maximis-
ing expected reward [11]. This framework has been used to simulate intelligent behaviour in neuroscience [15–20],
artificial intelligence [21–29] and robotics [30]. Given the prevalence of reinforcement learning (RL) and stochastic
optimal control in these fields, it is useful to understand the relationship between active inference and these established
approaches to modelling purposeful behaviour.
Stochastic control calls on strategies that evaluate different actions on a carefully handcrafted forward model of
stochastic dynamics and then selects the reward-maximising action. RL has a broader and more ambitious scope.
Loosely speaking, RL is a collection of methods that learn reward-maximising actions from data and seek to maximise
reward in the long run. Many RL algorithms are model-free, which means that agents learn a reward-maximising
state-action mapping, based on updating cached state-action pair values, through initially random actions that do
not consider future state transitions. In contrast, model-based RL algorithms attempt to extend model-based control
approaches by learning the dynamics and reward function from data. Because RL is a data driven field, particular
algorithms are selected based on how well they perform on benchmark problems. This has yielded a zoo of diverse al-
gorithms, many designed to solve specific problems and each with their own strengths and limitations. This makes RL
difficult to characterise as a whole. Thankfully, many RL algorithms and approaches to solving control problems orig-
inate or otherwise build upon dynamic programming under the Bellman equation [31,32], a collection of methods that
maximise cumulative reward (although this often becomes computationally intractable in real-world problems) [33].
In what follows, we consider the relationship between active inference and dynamic programming, and discuss its
implications in the broader context of RL.
This leads us to discuss the apparent differences between active inference and RL. First, while RL agents select
actions to maximise cumulative reward (e.g., the solution to the Bellman equation [31]), active inference agents select
actions so that predicted states match a target distribution encoding preferred states. In fact, active inference also
builds upon previous work on the duality between inference and control [34–37] to solve motor control problems via
approximate inference [38–40]. Treating the control problem as an inference problem in this fashion, is also known as
planning as inference [41, 42]. Second, active inference agents always embody a generative (i.e., forward) model of
their environment, while RL comprises both model-based algorithms as well as simpler model-free algorithms. Third,
modelling exploratory behaviour – which can improve reward maximisation in the long run (especially in volatile
environments) – is implemented differently in the two approaches. In most cases RL implements a simple form of
exploration by incorporating randomness in decision-making [43, 44], where the level of randomness may or may
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not change over time as a function of uncertainty. In other cases, RL incorporates ad-hoc "information bonus" terms
to build in goal-directed exploratory drives. In contrast, goal-directed exploration emerges naturally within active
inference through interactions between the reward and information gain terms in the expected free energy [11, 14].
Although not covered in detail here, active inference can accommodate a principled form of random exploration
(a.k.a. matching behaviour) by sampling actions from a posterior belief distribution over actions, whose precision is
itself optimised – such that action selection becomes more random when the expected outcomes of actions are more
uncertain [45]. Finally, traditional RL approaches have usually focused on cases where agents know their current
state with certainty, and thus eschew uncertainty in state estimation (although, RL schemes can be supplemented with
Bayesian state-estimation algorithms, leading to Bayesian RL). In contrast, active inference integrates state-estimation,
learning, decision-making, and motor control under the single objective of minimising free energy [11].
Despite these well-known differences, the relationship between active inference and RL, and particularly between
the objectives of free energy minimization and reward maximization, has not been thoroughly explicated. Their
relationship has become increasingly important to understand, as a growing body of research has begun to 1) compare
the performance of active inference and RL models in simulated environments [18, 21, 23], 2) apply active inference
to study human behaviour on reward learning tasks [46–48], and 3) consider the complementary predictions and
interpretations they each offer in computational neuroscience, psychology, and psychiatry [14, 18, 45, 49]. In what
follows, we try to clarify the relationship between RL and active inference and identify the conditions under which
they are equivalent.
Despite apparent differences, we show that there is a formal relationship between active inference and RL that is most
clearly seen with model-based RL. Specifically, we will see that dynamic programming under the Bellman equation
is a limiting case of active inference on finite-horizon partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs).
Equivalently, we show that a limiting case of active inference maximises reward on finite-horizon POMDPs. However,
active inference also covers scenarios that do not involve reward maximization, as it can be used to solve any problem
that can be cast in terms of reaching and maintaining a target distribution on a suitable state-space (see [11, Appendix
B]). In brief, active inference reduces to dynamic programming when the target distribution is a (uniform mixture of)
Dirac distribution over reward maximising trajectories. Note that, in infinite horizon POMDPs, active inference will
not necessarily furnish the solution to the Bellman equation, as it plans only up to finite temporal horizons.
In what follows, we first review dynamic programming on finite-horizon Markov Decision Processes (MDPs; Section
2). Next, we introduce active inference for finite-horizon MDPs (Section 3). Third, we demonstrate how active infer-
ence reduces to dynamic programming in a limiting case (Section 4). Finally, we show how these results generalise
to POMDPs (Section 4.4). We conclude with a discussion of the implications of these results and future directions
(Section 5).
2 Dynamic programming on finite horizon MDPs
2.1 Basic definitions
Markov decision processes (MDPs) are a class of models specifying environmental dynamics widely used in dynamic
programming, model-based reinforcement learning, and more broadly in engineering and artificial intelligence [33,50].
They have been used to simulate sequential decision-making tasks with the objective of maximising a reward or utility
function. An MDP specifies the environmental dynamics in discrete time and space given the actions pursued by an
agent.
Definition 2.1 (Finite horizon MDP). A finite horizon MDP comprises the following tuple:
• S a finite set of states.
• T = {0, ..., T} a finite set which stands for discrete time. T is the temporal horizon or planning horizon.
• A is a finite set of actions.
• P (st = s′|st−1 = s, at−1 = a) is the probability that action a ∈ A in state s ∈ S at time t − 1 will lead to
state s′ ∈ S at time t. st are random variables over S, which correspond to the state being occupied at time
t = 0, ..., T .
• P (s0 = s) specifies the probability of being at state s ∈ S at the start of the trial.
• R(s) is the finite reward received by the agent when at state s ∈ S.
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Figure 1: Finite horizon Markov decision process. This is a Markov decision process illustrated using a Bayesian
network [8, 51]. A finite horizon MDP comprises a finite sequence of states, indexed in time. The transition from one
state to the next state depends on action. As such, the dynamics of the MDP can be regarded as a Markov chain on
state-space, given the action sequence. Thus, the only degree of freedom is the action that is selected. This selection
can be specified in terms of a state-action policy, Π: a probabilistic mapping from space-time to actions.
The dynamics afforded by a finite horizon MDP can be written globally as a probability distribution over trajectories
s0:T := (s0, . . . , sT ), given a sequence of actions a0:T−1 := (a0, . . . , aT−1). This factorises as the following:
P (s0:T |a0:T−1) = P (s0)
T∏
τ=1
P (sτ |sτ−1, aτ−1).
These MDP dynamics can be regarded as a Markov chain on the state-space S, given a sequence of actions (see Figure
1).
Remark 2.2 (On the definition of reward). More generally, the reward function can be taken to be dependent on the
previous action and previous state: Ra (s′|s) is the reward received after transitioning from state s to state s′, due to
action a [33, 50]. However, given an MDP with such a reward function, we can recover our simplified setting without
loss of generality. We define a new MDP where the states comprise the previous action, previous state, and current
state in the original MDP. By inspection, the resulting reward function on the new MDP depends only on the current
state (i.e., R(s)).
Remark 2.3 (Admissible actions). In general, it is possible that not all actions are available at every state. Thus, As
is defined to be the finite set of (allowable) actions available from state s ∈ S. All the results in this paper concerning
MDPs can be extended to this setting.
Given an MDP, the agent transitions from one state to the next as time unfolds. The transitions depend on the agent’s
actions. The goal under reinforcement learning is to select actions that maximise expected reward. To formalise what
it means to choose actions, we introduce the notion of a state-action policy.
Definition 2.4 (State-action policy). A state-action policy is a probability distribution over actions, that depends on
the state that the agent occupies, and time. Explicitly, it is a function Π that satisfies:
Π : A× S× T→ [0, 1]
(a, s, t) 7→ Π(a|s, t)
∀(s, t) ∈ S× T :
∑
a∈A
Π(a|s, t) = 1.
When st = s, we will write Π(a|st) := Π(a|s, t). Additionally, the action at time T is redundant, as no further reward
can be reaped from the environment. Therefore, one often specifies state-action policies only up to time T − 1. This
is equivalent to defining a state-action policy as Π : A× S× {0, . . . , T − 1} → [0, 1].
The state-action policy – as defined here – is stochastic and can be regarded as a generalisation of a deterministic
policy that assigns the probability of 1 to one of the available actions, and 0 otherwise [52].
Remark 2.5 (Conflicting terminologies: policy in active inference). In active inference, a policy is defined as a se-
quence of actions indexed in time. To avoid terminological confusion, we use sequence of actions to denote a policy
under active inference.
As previously mentioned, the goal for a reinforcement learning agent at time t is to choose actions that maximise
future cumulative reward:
R(st+1:T ) :=
T∑
τ=t+1
R(sτ ).
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More precisely, the goal is to follow a state-action policy Π that maximises the state-value function:
vΠ(s, t) := EΠ[R(st+1:T ) | st = s]
∀(s, t) ∈ S × T. The state-value function scores the expected cumulative reward if the agent pursues state-action
policy Π from state st = s. When st = s is clear from context, we will often write vΠ(st) := vΠ(s, t). Loosely
speaking, we will call the expected reward the return.
Remark 2.6 (Notation: EΠ). Whilst standard in reinforcement learning [33, 50], the notation
EΠ[R(st+1:T ) | st = s]
can be misleading. It denotes the expected reward, under the transition probabilities of the MDP for a particular
state-action policy Π:
EP (st+1:T |at:T−1,st=s)Π(at:T−1|st+1:T−1,st=s)[R(st+1:T )].
It is important to keep this correspondence in mind, as we will use both notations depending on context.
Remark 2.7 (Temporal discounting). In infinite horizon MDPs (i.e., when T is infinite), we often add a temporal
discounting term γ ∈ (0, 1) [32, 33, 50] such that the infinite sum
vΠ(s, t) := EΠ[
∞∑
τ=t+1
γR(sτ ) | st = s]
converges. However, under the finite temporal horizons considered here, the expected reward converges regardless of
γ, which eschews the need to include temporal discounting when evaluating expected reward. Thus, in what follows,
we set γ = 1.
We want to rank state-action policies in terms of their expected reward. To do this, we introduce a partial ordering on
state-action policies, such that a state-action policy is better than another when it yields higher expected rewards in
any situation:
Π ≥ Π′ ⇐⇒ ∀(s, t) ∈ S × T : vΠ(s, t) ≥ vΠ′(s, t).
Similarly, a state-action policy Π is strictly better than Π′ if
Π > Π′ ⇐⇒ Π ≥ Π′ and ∃(s, t) ∈ S × T : vΠ(s, t) > vΠ′(s, t).
2.2 Bellman optimal state-action policies
Definition 2.8 (Bellman optimal state-action policy). A state-action policy Π∗ is said to be Bellman optimal if, and
only if, Π∗ ≥ Π,∀Π. That is, if it maximises the state-value function vΠ(s, t) for any state s at time t.
In other words, a state-action policy is Bellman optimal if it is better than all alternatives. It is important to show that
this concept is not vacuous. For this, we prove a classical result [32, 52]:
Proposition 2.9 (Existence of Bellman optimal state-action policies). Given a finite horizon MDP as specified in
Definition 2.1, there exists a Bellman optimal state-action policy Π∗.
Note that uniqueness of the Bellman optimal state-action policy is not implied by Proposition 2.9. Indeed, it is a
general feature of MDPs that there can be multiple Bellman optimal state-action policies [32, 52].
Proof. Note that a Bellman optimal state-action policy Π∗ is a maximal element according to the partial ordering ≤.
Existence thus consists of a simple application of Zorn’s lemma. Zorn’s lemma states that if any increasing chain
Π1 ≤ Π2 ≤ Π3 ≤ . . . (1)
has an upper bound that is a state-action policy, then there is a maximal element Π∗.
Given the chain (1), we construct an upper bound. We enumerate A × S × T by (α1, σ1, t1), ..., (αN , σN , tN ). Then
the state-action policy sequence
Πn(α1|σ1, t1), n = 1, 2, 3, . . .
is bounded within [0, 1]. By the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem, there exists a subsequence Πnk(α1|σ1, t1), k =
1, 2, 3, . . . that converges. Similarly, Πnk(α2|σ2, t2) is also a bounded sequence, and by Bolzano-Weierstrass it has
a subsequence Πnkj (a2|σ2, t2) that converges. We repeatedly take subsequences until N . To ease notation, call the
resulting subsequence Πm, m = 1, 2, 3, . . .
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With this, we define Πˆ = limm→∞Πm. It is straightforward to see that Πˆ is a state-action policy:
Πˆ(α|σ, t) = lim
m→∞Πm(α|σ, t) ∈ [0, 1], ∀(α, σ, t) ∈ A× S× T,∑
α∈A
Πˆ(α|σ, t) = lim
m→∞
∑
α∈A
Πm(α|σ, t) = 1, ∀(σ, t) ∈ S× T.
To show that Πˆ is an upper bound, take any Π in the original chain of state-action policies (1). Then by the definition
of an increasing subsequence, there exists an index M ∈ N such that ∀k ≥ M : Πk ≥ Π. Since limits commute with
finite sums, we have vΠˆ(s, t) = limm→∞ vΠm(s, t) ≥ vΠk(s, t) ≥ vΠ(s, t) for any (s, t) ∈ S × T. Thus, by Zorn’s
lemma there exists a Bellman optimal state-action policy Π∗.
Now that we know that Bellman optimal state-action policies exist, we can characterise them recursively as a return-
maximising action followed by a Bellman optimal state-action policy.
Proposition 2.10 (Characterisation of Bellman optimal state-action policies). For a state-action policy Π, the follow-
ing are equivalent:
1. Π is Bellman optimal.
2. Π is
(a) Bellman optimal when restricted to {1, . . . , T}. In other words, ∀ state-action policy Π′ and (s, t) ∈
S× {1, . . . T}
vΠ(s, t) ≥ vΠ′(s, t).
(b) At time 0, Π selects actions that maximise return:
Π(a|s, 0) > 0 ⇐⇒ a ∈ arg max
a∈A
EΠ[R(s1:T ) | s0 = s, a0 = a], ∀s ∈ S. (2)
Note that this characterisation offers a recursive way to construct Bellman optimal state-action policies by backwards
induction (i.e., by successively selecting the best action), as specified by Equation 2, starting from T and inducting
backwards [52].
Proof. 1) ⇒ 2) : We only need to show assertion (b). By contradiction, suppose that ∃(s, α) ∈ S × A such that
Π(α|s, 0) > 0 and
EΠ[R(s1:T ) | s0 = s, a0 = α] < max
a∈A
EΠ[R(s1:T ) | s0 = s, a0 = a].
We let α′ be the Bellman optimal action at state s and time 0 defined as
α′ := arg max
a∈A
EΠ[R(s1:T ) | s0 = s, a0 = a].
Then, we let Π′ be the same state-action policy as Π except that Π′(·|s, 0) assigns α′ deterministically. Then,
vΠ(s, 0) =
∑
a∈A
EΠ[R(s1:T ) | s0 = s, a0 = a]Π(a|s, 0)
< max
a∈A
EΠ[R(s1:T ) | s0 = s, a0 = a]
= EΠ′ [R(s1:T ) | s0 = s, a0 = α′]Π′(α′|s, 0)
=
∑
a∈A
EΠ′ [R(s1:T ) | s0 = s, a0 = a]Π′(a|s, 0)
= vΠ′(s, 0).
So Π is not Bellman optimal, which is a contradiction.
1) ⇐ 2) : We only need to show that Π maximises vΠ(s, 0),∀s ∈ S. By contradiction, there exists a state-action
policy Π′ and a state s ∈ S such that
vΠ(s, 0) < vΠ′(s, 0)
⇐⇒
∑
a∈A
EΠ[R(s1:T ) | s0 = s, a0 = a]Π(a|s, 0) <
∑
a∈A
EΠ′ [R(s1:T ) | s0 = s, a0 = a]Π′(a|s, 0).
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By (a) the left hand side equals
max
a∈A
EΠ[R(s1:T ) | s0 = s, a0 = a].
Unpacking the expression on the right-hand side:
∑
a∈A
EΠ′ [R(s1:T ) | s0 = s, a0 = a]Π′(a|s, 0)
=
∑
a∈A
∑
σ∈S
EΠ′ [R(s1:T ) | s1 = σ]P (s1 = σ|s0 = s, a0 = a)Π′(a|s, 0)
=
∑
a∈A
∑
σ∈S
{EΠ′ [R(s2:T ) | s1 = σ] +R(σ)}P (s1 = σ|s0 = s, a0 = a)Π′(a|s, 0)
=
∑
a∈A
∑
σ∈S
{vΠ′(σ, 1) +R(σ)]P (s1 = σ|s0 = s, a0 = a)Π′(a|s, 0)
(3)
Since Π is Bellman optimal when restricted to {1, . . . , T} we have vΠ′(σ, 1) ≤ vΠ(σ, 1),∀σ ∈ S. Therefore,∑
a∈A
∑
σ∈S
{vΠ′(σ, 1) +R(σ)]P (s1 = σ|s0 = s, a0 = a)Π′(a|s, 0)
≤
∑
a∈A
∑
σ∈S
{vΠ(σ, 1) +R(σ)]P (s1 = σ|s0 = s, a0 = a)Π′(a|s, 0).
Repeating the steps above (3), but in reverse order, yields
∑
a∈A
EΠ′ [R(s1:T ) | s0 = s, a0 = a]Π′(a|s, 0) ≤
∑
a∈A
EΠ[R(s1:T ) | s0 = s, a0 = a]Π′(a|s, 0)
However, ∑
a∈A
EΠ[R(s1:T ) | s0 = s, a0 = a]Π′(a|s, 0) < max
a∈A
EΠ[R(s1:T ) | s0 = s, a0 = a]
which is a contradiction.
2.3 Backward induction
Proposition 2.10 suggests a straightforward recursive algorithm to construct Bellman optimal state-action policies
known as backward induction [52]. Backward induction entails reasoning backwards in time, from a goal state at the
end of a problem or solution, to determine a sequence of Bellman optimal actions. It proceeds by first considering
the last time at which a decision might be made and choosing what to do in any situation at that time. Using this
information, one can then determine what to do at the second-to-last decision time. This process continues backwards
until one has determined the best action for every possible situation or state at every point in time. This algorithm
has a long history. It was developed by the German mathematician Zermelo in 1913 to prove that chess has Bellman
optimal strategies [53]. In stochastic control, backward induction is one of the main methods for solving the Bellman
equation [54–56]. In game theory, the same method is used to compute sub-game perfect equilibria in sequential
games [57, 58].
Proposition 2.11 (Backward induction: construction of Bellman optimal state-action policies). Backward induction
Π(a|s, T − 1) > 0 ⇐⇒ a ∈ arg max
a∈A
E[R(sT ) | sT−1 = s, aT−1 = a], ∀s ∈ S
Π(a|s, T − 2) > 0 ⇐⇒ a ∈ arg max
a∈A
EΠ[R(sT−1:T ) | sT−2 = s, aT−2 = a], ∀s ∈ S
...
Π(a|s, 0) > 0 ⇐⇒ a ∈ arg max
a∈A
EΠ[R(s1:T ) | s0 = s, a0 = a], ∀s ∈ S
(4)
defines a Bellman optimal state-action policy Π. Furthermore, this characterisation is complete: all Bellman optimal
state-action policies satisfy the backward induction relation (4).
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Intuitively, this recursive scheme (4) consists of planning backwards, by starting from the end goal and working out
the actions needed to achieve the goal.
Example 2.12. To give a concrete example of this kind of planning, the present scheme would consider the example
actions below in the following order:
1. Desired goal: I would like to go to the grocery store,
2. Intermediate action: I need to drive to the store,
3. Current best action: I should put my shoes on.
Proof of Proposition 2.11. • We first prove that state-action policies Π defined as in (4) are Bellman optimal
by induction on T .
T = 1 :
Π(a|s, 0) > 0 ⇐⇒ a ∈ arg max
a
E[R(s1) | s0 = s, a0 = a], ∀s ∈ S
is a Bellman optimal state-action policy as it maximises the total reward possible in the MDP.
Let T > 1 be finite and suppose that the Proposition holds for MDPs with a temporal horizon of T − 1. This
means that
Π(a|s, T − 1) > 0 ⇐⇒ a ∈ arg max
a
E[R(sT ) | sT−1 = s, aT−1 = a], ∀s ∈ S
Π(a|s, T − 2) > 0 ⇐⇒ a ∈ arg max
a
EΠ[R(sT−1:T ) | sT−2 = s, aT−2 = a], ∀s ∈ S
...
Π(a|s, 1) > 0 ⇐⇒ a ∈ arg max
a
EΠ[R(s2:T ) | s1 = s, a1 = a], ∀s ∈ S
is a Bellman optimal state-action policy on the MDP restricted to times 1 to T . Therefore, since
Π(a|s, 0) > 0 ⇐⇒ a ∈ arg max
a
EΠ[R(s1:T ) | s0 = s, a0 = a], ∀s ∈ S
Proposition 2.10 allows us to deduce that Π is Bellman optimal.
• We now show that any Bellman optimal state-action policy satisfies the backward induction algorithm (4).
Suppose by contradiction that there exists a state-action policy Π that is Bellman optimal but does not satisfy
(4). Say, ∃(a, s, t) ∈ A× S× T, t < T , such that
Π(a|s, t) > 0 and a /∈ arg max
α∈A
EΠ[R(st+1:T ) | st = s, at = α].
This implies
EΠ[R(st+1:T ) | st = s, at = a] < max
α∈A
EΠ[R(st+1:T ) | st = s, at = α].
Let a˜ ∈ arg maxα EΠ[R(st+1:T ) | st = s, at = α]. Let Π˜ be a state-action policy such that Π˜(·|s, t) assigns
a˜ ∈ A deterministically, and such that Π˜ = Π otherwise. Then we can contradict the Bellman optimality of
Π as follows
vΠ(s, t) = EΠ[R(st+1:T )|st = s]
=
∑
α∈A
EΠ[R(st+1:T )|st = s, at = α]Π(α|s, t)
< max
α∈A
EΠ[R(st+1:T ) | st = s, at = α]
= EΠ[R(st+1:T ) | st = s, at = a˜]
= EΠ˜[R(st+1:T ) | st = s, at = a˜]
=
∑
α∈A
EΠ˜[R(st+1:T )|st = s, at = α]Π˜(α|s, t)
= vΠ˜(s, t).
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This concludes our discussion of dynamic programming on finite horizon MDPs.
3 Active inference on finite horizon MDPs
We now turn to active inference agents on finite horizon MDPs.
Here, the agent’s generative model of its environment is modelled using the previously defined finite horizon MDP
(see Definition 2.1). This means that we assume that the transition probabilities are known. We do not consider the
general case where the transitions have to be learned but comment on it in the discussion (also see Appendix A).
In what follows, we fix a time t ≥ 0 and suppose that the agent has been in states s0, . . . , st. To ease notation we let
~s := st+1:T ,~a := at:T be the future states and future actions.
Let Q be the predictive distribution of the agent. That is, the distribution specifying the next actions and states that the
agent encounters and pursues when at state st
Q(~s,~a|st) :=
T−1∏
τ=t
Q(sτ+1|aτ , sτ )Q(aτ |sτ ).
3.1 Perception as inference
In active inference, perception implies inferences about future, past, and current states given observations and a se-
quence of actions. In active inference, this is done through variational Bayesian inference by minimising (variational)
free energy (a.k.a. an evidence bound in machine learning) [6, 7, 13]. See [11] for details on active inference in the
partially observable setting.
In the MDP setting, past and current states are known, hence it is only necessary to infer future states, given the current
state and a sequence of actions, P (~s|~a, st). These posteriors P (~s|~a, st) are known in virtue of the fact that the agent
knows the transition probabilities of the MDP; hence variational inference becomes exact Bayesian inference.
Q(~s|~a, st) := P (~s|~a, st) =
T−1∏
τ=t
P (sτ+1|sτ , aτ ) (5)
Remark 3.1 (Unknown transition probabilities). When the probabilities or reward are unknown to the agent the prob-
lem is one of reinforcement learning [59]. Although we do not consider this scenario here, when the model is unknown,
we simply equip the agents generative model with a prior, and the model is then updated via variational Bayesian in-
ference to fit the observed data. Depending on the specific learning problem and generative model structure, this can
involve updating the transition probabilities (i.e., the probability of transitioning to a rewarding state under each ac-
tion) and/or the target distribution C (to be defined later); in POMDPs it can also involve updating the probabilities of
observations under each state. See Appendix A for further details on how active inference implements reward learning
and potential connections to representative RL approaches; and see [11] for details on modelling learning in active
inference more generally.
3.2 Planning as inference
Now that the agent has inferred future states given different sequences of actions, we must score these sequences using
the goodness of the resulting state trajectories (in terms of C). The expected free energy does exactly this: it is the
objective that active inference agents minimise in order the select the best possible action.
Under active inference, agents minimize expected free energy in order to maintain a steady-state distribution C over
the state-space S. This steady-state specifies the agent’s preferences, or the characteristic states it returns to after being
perturbed. The expected free energy is defined as a functional of this steady-state distribution. In the absence of any
observed or latent states, the expected free energy reduces to the following form (which is a special case of expected
free energy for partially observed MDPs – see Section 4.4).
Definition 3.2 (Expected free energy). In MDPs, the expected free energy of an action sequence ~a starting from st is
defined as [11]:
G(~a|st) = DKL[Q(~s|~a, st)‖C(~s)] (6)
Therefore, minimising expected free energy corresponds to making the distribution over predicted states close to the
distribution C that encodes prior preferences.
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The expected free energy may be rewritten as
G(~a|st) = EQ(~s|~a,st)[− logC(~s)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected surprise
− H[Q(~s|~a, st)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entropy of future states
(7)
Hence, minimising expected free energy minimises the expected surprise of states2 according to C and maximising
the entropy of Bayesian beliefs over future states (a maximum entropy principle [61, 62]).
Evaluating the expected free energy of courses of action corresponds to planning as inference [41, 42]. This follows
from the fact that the expected free energy scores the goodness of inferred future states.
Remark 3.3 (Numerical tractability). The expected free energy is straightforward to compute using linear algebra.
Given an action sequence ~a, C(~s) and Q(~s|~a, st) are categorical distributions over ST−t. Let their parameters be
c, s~a ∈ [0, 1]|S|(T−1), where | · | denotes the cardinality of a set. Then:
G(~a|st) = sT~a (log s~a − log c) (8)
Notwithstanding, (8) is expensive to evaluate repeatedly when all possible action sequences are considered. In practice,
one can adopt a temporal mean field approximation over future states [63]:
Q(~s|~a, st) ≈
T∏
τ=t+1
Q(sτ |~a, st),
which yields the simplified expression
G(~a|st) ≈
T∑
τ=t+1
DKL[Q(sτ |~a, st)‖C(sτ )]. (9)
Expression (9) is much easier to handle: for each action sequence ~a, 1) one evaluates the summands sequentially
τ = t + 1, . . . , T , and 2) if and when the sum up to τ becomes significantly higher than the lowest expected free
energy encountered during planning, G(~a|st) is set to an arbitrarily high value. Setting G(~a|st) to an high value is
equivalent to pruning away unlikely trajectories. This bears some similarity to decision tree pruning procedures used
in RL [64]. It finesses exploration of the decision-tree in full depth and provides an Occam’s window for selecting
action sequences.
There are complementary approaches to make planning tractable. For example, hierarchical generative models fac-
torise decisions into multiple levels. By abstracting information at a higher-level, lower-levels entertain fewer ac-
tions [65] – which reduces the depth of the decision tree by orders of magnitude. Another approach is to use algorithms
that search the decision-tree selectively, such as Monte-Carlo tree search [66, 67], and amortising the expected free
energy minimisation using artificial neural networks (i.e., learning to plan [28]).
4 Reward maximisation as active inference
4.1 Reward maximisation as reaching preferences
From the definition of expected free energy (6), active inference can be thought of as reaching and remaining at a
target distribution C over state-space. This distribution encodes the agent’s preferences. In short, simulating active
inference can be regarded as engineering a stationary process [12], where the stationary distribution encodes the agent’s
preferences.
The idea that underwrites the rest of this paper is that when the stationary distribution has all of its mass on reward
maximising states, then the agent will maximise reward. To illustrate this, we define a distributionCλ, λ > 0, encoding
the agent’s preferences over state-space S, such that rewarding states become preferred states.
Cλ(σ) :=
expλR(σ)∑
ς∈S expλR(ς)
∝ exp(λR(σ)), ∀σ ∈ S
⇐⇒ − logCλ(σ) = −λR(σ)− c(λ), ∀σ ∈ S, for some c(λ) ∈ R constant w.r.t σ.
2The surprise of states− logC(s) is an information theoretic term [60] that scores the extent to which an observation is unusual
under C. It does not mean that the agent consciously experiences surprise.
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The parameter λ > 0 is an inverse temperature parameter, which scores how motivated the agent is to occupy reward
maximising states. Note that states s ∈ S that maximise the reward R(s) maximise Cλ(s) and minimise − logCλ(s)
for any λ > 0.
Using the additive property of the reward function, we can extend Cλ to a probability distribution over trajectories
~σ := (σ1, . . . , σT ) ∈ ST . Specifically, Cλ scores to what extent a trajectory is preferred over another trajectory:
Cλ(~σ) :=
expλR(~σ)∑
~ς∈ST expλR(~ς)
=
T∏
τ=1
expλR(στ )∑
ς∈S expλR(ς)
=
T∏
τ=1
Cλ(στ ), ∀~σ ∈ ST
⇐⇒ − logCλ(~σ) = −λR(~σ)− c′(λ) = −
T∑
τ=1
λR(στ )− c′(λ), ∀~σ ∈ ST , where c′(λ) := c(λ)T ∈ R constant w.r.t ~σ.
(10)
When the preferences are defined in this way, the zero-temperature limit λ → +∞ is the case where the preferences
are non-zero only for states or trajectories that maximise reward. In this case, limλ→+∞ Cλ is a uniform mixture of
Dirac distributions over reward maximising trajectories:
lim
λ→+∞
Cλ ∝
∑
~s∈IT−t
Dirac~s
I := arg max
s∈S
R(s).
(11)
This is because, for a reward maximising state σ, exp(λR(σ)) will converge to +∞ more quickly than exp(λR(σ′))
for a non-reward maximising state σ′. Since Cλ is constrained to be normalised to 1 (as it is a probability distribution),
Cλ(σ
′) λ→+∞−−−−−→ 0. Hence, in the limit λ→ +∞, Cλ is non-zero (and uniform) only on reward maximising states.
We now show how reaching preferred states can be formulated as reward maximisation:
Lemma 4.1. The sequence of actions that minimises expected free energy also maximises expected reward in the
limiting case λ→ +∞:
lim
λ→+∞
arg min
~a
G(~a|st) ⊆ arg max
~a
EQ(~s|~a,st)[R(~s)]
Furthermore, of those action sequences that maximise expected reward, the expected free energy minimisers will be
those that maximize the entropy of future states H[Q(~s|~a, st)].
Proof.
lim
λ→+∞
arg min
~a
DKL[Q(~s|~a, st)‖Cλ(~s)]
= lim
λ→+∞
arg min
~a
−H[Q(~s|~a, st)] + EQ(~s|~a,st)[− logCλ(~s)]
= lim
λ→+∞
arg min
~a
−H[Q(~s|~a, st)]− λEQ(~s|~a,st)[R(~s)]
= lim
λ→+∞
arg max
~a
H[Q(~s|~a, st)] + λEQ(~s|~a,st)[R(~s)]
⊆ lim
λ→+∞
arg max
~a
λEQ(~s|~a,st)[R(~s)]
= arg max
~a
EQ(~s|~a,st)[R(~s)]
The inclusion follows from the fact that, as λ → +∞, a minimiser of the expected free energy has to maximise
EQ(~s|~a,st)[R(~s)]. Among such action sequences, the expected free energy minimisers are those that maximise the
entropy of future states H[Q(~s|~a, st)].
In the zero temperature limit λ→ +∞, minimising expected free energy corresponds to choosing the action sequence
~a such that Q(~s|~a, st) has most mass on reward maximising states or trajectories. See Figure 2 for an illustration. Of
those candidates with the same amount of mass, the maximiser of the entropy of future states H[Q(~s|~a, st)] will be
chosen.
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Figure 2: Reaching preferences and the zero temperature limit. We illustrate how active inference selects actions
such thatQ(~s|~a, st) most closely matches the preference distributionCλ (top-right). In this example, the discrete state-
space is a discretisation of a continuous interval in R, and the preferences and predictive distributions over states have
a Gaussian shape. The predictive distribution Q is assumed to have a fixed variance with respect to action sequences,
such that the only parameter that can be optimised by action selection is its mean. Crucially, in the zero temperature
limit (11), limλ→+∞ Cλ becomes a Dirac distribution over the reward maximising state (bottom). Thus, minimising
expected free energy corresponds to selecting the action, such that the predicted states assign most mass to the reward
maximising state (bottom-right). Q∗ := Q(~s|~a∗, st) denotes the predictive distribution over states given the action
sequence that minimises expected free energy ~a∗ = arg min~aG(~a|st).
4.2 Bellman optimality on a temporal horizon of 1
In this section we first consider the case of a single-step decision problem (i.e., temporal horizon of T = 1) and demon-
strate how one simple active inference scheme maximizes reward on this problem in the limit λ→ +∞. This will act
as an important building block for when we subsequently consider the more general multi-step decision problems that
are addressed by both generic dynamic programming and active inference. In the multi-step case (T > 1), we will
show that this simple active inference scheme is not guaranteed to maximize reward. However, when considering this
more general class of decision problems, it is important to emphasise that, similar to RL, active inference is a broad
normative framework that encompasses multiple algorithms or schemes. Thus, when we subsequently address multi-
step decision problems, we will also show how a second, more sophisticated active inference scheme does maximise
reward in the limit λ → +∞. These two schemes differ only in how the agent forms beliefs about the best possible
courses of action when minimising expected free energy3.
The most common action selection procedure consists of assigning the probability of action sequences to be the
softmax of the negative expected free energy [11, 71]
Q(~a|st) ∝ exp(−G(~a|st))
Action selection under active inference usually involves selecting the most likely action under Q(~a|st):
3The additional degree of freedom one has in POMDPs is specifying the family of distributions to optimise variational free
energy over, in order to infer states from observations. See [11, 68–70] for details.
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at ∈ arg max
a∈A
Q(a|st)
= arg max
a∈A
∑
~a
Q(a|~a)Q(~a|st)
= arg max
a∈A
∑
~a
Q(a|~a) exp(−G(~a|st))
= arg max
a∈A
∑
~a
(~a)t=a
exp(−G(~a|st))
In other words, this scheme selects actions that maximise the exponentiated negative expected free energies of all
possible future action sequences. This means that if one action is part of an action sequence with very low expected
free energy, this score is exponentiated and adds a large contribution to the selection of that particular action.
See Table 1 for a summary of this scheme.
Table 1: Example of an active inference scheme on finite horizon MDPs.
Process Computation
Perceptual inference Q(~s|~a, st) = P (~s|~a, st) =
∏T−1
τ=t P (sτ+1|sτ , aτ )
Planning as inference G(~a|st) = DKL[Q(~s|~a, st)‖C(~s)]
Decision-making Q(~a|st) ∝ exp(−G(~a|st))
Action selection at ∈ arg maxa∈A [Q(at = a|st) =
∑
~aQ(at = a|~a)Q(~a|st)]
Theorem 4.2. In the zero temperature limit λ→ +∞, the state-action policy defined as in Table 1
at ∈ lim
λ→+∞
arg max
a∈A
∑
~a
(~a)t=a
exp(−G(~a|st))
G(~a|st) = DKL[Q(~s|~a, st)‖Cλ(~s)]
(12)
is Bellman optimal for the temporal horizon T = 1.
Proof. When T = 1 the only action is a0. We fix an arbitrary initial state s0 = s ∈ S. By Proposition 2.10, a Bellman
optimal state-action policy is fully characterised by an action a∗0 that maximises immediate reward
a∗0 ∈ arg max
a∈A
E[R(s1) | s0 = s, a0 = a].
Recall that by Remark 2.6, this expectation stands for return under the transition probabilities of the MDP
a∗0 ∈ arg max
a∈A
EP (s1|a0=a,s0=s)[R(s1)].
Since transition probabilities are assumed to be known (5), this reads
a∗0 ∈ arg max
a∈A
EQ(s1|a0=a,s0=s)[R(s1)].
On the other hand,
a0 ∈ lim
λ→+∞
arg max
a∈A
exp(−G(a|st))
= lim
λ→+∞
arg min
a∈A
G(a|st).
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By Lemma 4.1, this implies
⇒ a0 ∈ arg max
a∈A
EQ(s1|a0=a,s0=s)[R(s1)],
which concludes the proof.
This scheme falls short in terms of Bellman optimality with a planning horizon of T > 1; this rests upon the fact that it
does not coincide with backward induction. Recall that backward induction offers a complete description of Bellman
optimal state-action policies (Proposition 2.11). In other words, active inference plans by adding weighted expected
free energies of each possible future course of action, as opposed to only considering those future courses of action
that will subsequently minimise expected free energy, given subsequently encountered states.
4.3 Bellman optimality on finite temporal horizons
To achieve Bellman optimality on finite temporal horizons, we turn to the expected free energy of an action given
future actions that also minimise expected free energy.
To do this we can write the expected free energy recursively, as: the immediate expected free energy, plus the expected
free energy that one would obtain by subsequently selecting actions that minimise expected free energy [10]. The
resulting scheme consists of minimising an expected free energy defined recursively, from the last time step to the
current timestep. In finite horizon MDPs this reads
G(aT−1|sT−1) = DKL[Q(sT |aT−1, sT−1)‖Cλ(sT )]
G(aτ |sτ ) = DKL[Q(sτ+1|aτ , sτ )‖Cλ(sτ+1)] + EQ(aτ+1,sτ+1|aτ ,sτ )[G(aτ+1|sτ+1)], τ = t, . . . , T − 2,
where at each time-step, actions are chosen to minimise expected free energy
Q(aτ+1|sτ+1) > 0 ⇐⇒ aτ+1 ∈ arg min
a∈A
G(a|sτ+1). (13)
To make sense of this formulation, we unpack the recursion
G(at|st) = DKL[Q(st+1|at, st)‖Cλ(st+1)] + EQ(at+1,st+1|at,st)[G(at+1|st+1)]
= DKL[Q(st+1|at, st)‖Cλ(st+1)] + DKL[Q(st+2|at+1, st+2)‖Cλ(st+2)]
+ EQ(at+1:t+2,st+1:t+2|at,st)[G(at+2|st+2)]
= . . .
=
T−1∑
τ=t
EQ(~a,~s|at,st) DKL[Q(sτ+1|aτ , sτ )‖Cλ(sτ+1)]
= EQ(~a,~s|at,st) DKL[Q(~s|~a, st)‖Cλ(~s)],
(14)
which shows that this expression is exactly the expected free energy under action at, if one is to pursue future actions
that minimise expected free energy (13).
The crucial improvement over the vanilla active inference scheme is that planning is now performed based on subse-
quent counterfactual actions that minimise expected free energy, as opposed to considering all future courses of action.
Translating this into the language of state-action policies yields ∀s ∈ S
aT−1(s) ∈ arg min
a∈A
G(a|sT−1 = s)
aT−2(s) ∈ arg min
a∈A
G(a|sT−2 = s)
...
a1(s) ∈ arg min
a∈A
G(a|s1 = s)
a0(s) ∈ arg min
a∈A
G(a|s0).
(15)
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Table 2: Alternative active inference scheme on finite horizon MDPs.
Process Computation
Perceptual inference Q(sτ+1|aτ , sτ ) = P (sτ+1|aτ , sτ )
Planning as inference G(aτ |sτ ) = DKL[Q(sτ+1|aτ , sτ )‖Cλ(sτ+1)] + EQ(aτ+1,sτ+1|aτ ,sτ )[G(aτ+1|sτ+1)]
Decision-making Q(aτ |sτ ) > 0 ⇐⇒ aτ ∈ arg mina∈AG(a|sτ )
Action selection at ∼ Q(at|st)
Equation (15) is strikingly similar to the backward induction algorithm (Proposition 2.11), and indeed we recover
backward induction in the limit λ→ +∞.
Theorem 4.3 (Backward induction as active inference). In the zero temperature limit λ → +∞, the scheme of Table
2
Q(aτ |sτ ) > 0 ⇐⇒ at ∈ lim
λ→+∞
arg min
a∈A
G(a|sτ )
G(aτ |sτ ) = DKL[Q(sτ+1|aτ , sτ )‖Cλ(sτ+1)] + EQ(aτ+1,sτ+1|aτ ,sτ )[G(aτ+1|sτ+1)]
(16)
satisfies the backward induction relation. Therefore, it is Bellman optimal on any finite temporal horizon. Further-
more, if there are multiple action choices that maximise future reward, that which is selected by active inference also
maximises a 7→ H[Q(~s|~a, a, s0)].
Remark 4.4. Note that, again, if there are multiple action choices that maximise future reward, the action selected by
active inference also maximises the expected entropy of future states – that is, the chosen action can be thought of as
also "keeping one’s options open" [72] in the sense that the agent commits the least to a specified sequence of states.
Proof. We prove this result by induction on the temporal horizon T of the MDP.
The proof of the Theorem when T = 1 can be seen from the proof of Theorem 4.2. Now suppose that T > 1 is finite
and that the Theorem holds for MDPs with a temporal horizon of T − 1.
Q(aτ |sτ ) as defined in (16) is a Bellman optimal state-action policy on the MDP restricted to times τ = 1, . . . , T by
induction. Therefore, by Proposition 2.10, we only need to show that the action a0 selected under active inference
satisfies
a0 ∈ arg max
a∈A
EQ[R(~s)|s0, a0 = a].
This is simple to show as
arg max
a∈A
EQ[R(~s)|s0, a0 = a]
= arg max
a∈A
EP (~s|a1:T ,a0=a,s0)Q(~a|s1:T )[R(~s)] (by Remark 2.6)
= arg max
a∈A
EQ(~s,~a|a0=a,s0)[R(~s)] (as the transitions are known)
= lim
λ→+∞
arg max
a∈A
EQ(~s,~a|a0=a,s0)[λR(~s)]
⊇ lim
λ→+∞
arg max
a∈A
EQ(~s,~a|a0=a,s0)[λR(~s)]−H[Q(~s|~a, a0 = a, s0)]
= lim
λ→+∞
arg min
a∈A
EQ(~s,~a|a0=a,s0)[− logCλ(~s)]−H[Q(~s|~a, a0 = a, s0)] (by (10))
= lim
λ→+∞
arg min
a∈A
EQ(~s,~a|a0=a,s0) DKL[Q(~s|~a, a0 = a, s0)‖Cλ(~s)]
= lim
λ→+∞
arg min
a∈A
G(a0 = a|s0) (by (14)).
Therefore, an action a0 selected under active inference is a Bellman optimal state-action policy on finite temporal
horizons. Furthermore, the inclusion follows from the fact that if there are multiple actions that maximise expected
reward, that which is selected under active inference maximises the entropy of beliefs about future states.
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4.4 Generalisation to partially observed MDPs
Partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) [73] differ from MDPs only in that the agent observes a
modality ot, which carries incomplete information about the current state st.
In POMDPs and under active inference, states are inferred from observations through variational Bayesian inference.
Let ~s := s0:T ,~a := a0:T−1 be all states and actions (past, current, and future), let o˜ := o0:t be the observations
available up to time t, and let ~o := ot+1:T be the future observations. The agent has a predictive distribution over
states given actions that is continuously updated following new observations
Q(~s|~a, o˜) :=
T−1∏
τ=0
Q(sτ+1|aτ , sτ , o˜).
To infer states from observations, the agent engages in variational Bayesian inference – an optimisation procedure
over a space of probability distributions Q(·|~a, o˜) called the variational family – to find the variational free energy
minimum
arg min
Q
F~a[Q(~s|~a, o˜)] = arg min
Q
DKL[Q(~s|~a, o˜)‖P (~s|~a, o˜)]
F~a[Q(~s|~a, o˜)] := DKL[Q(~s|~a, o˜)‖P (o˜, ~s|~a)].
(17)
Here, P (o˜, ~s|~a) is a prior that is supplied to the agent (also a POMDP), and P (~s|~a, o˜) is the posterior estimate over
states (that is usually intractable to compute directly). Note that equipping the agent with a prior has been one of
the main difficulties in scaling active inference. Toward this end, recent research has explored learning the agent’s
generative model with deep neural networks, allowing enough flexibility for the model to adapt to the environment at
hand [21, 24, 30].
Crucially, when the free energy minimum (17) is reached, the inference is exact
Q(~s|~a, o˜) = P (~s|~a, o˜). (18)
For numerical tractability, the variational family may be constrained to a parametric family of distributions, in which
case equality is not guaranteed Q(~s|~a, o˜) ≈ P (~s|~a, o˜). In POMDPs, the expected free energy reads [11]
G(~a|o˜) = DKL[Q(~s|~a, o˜)‖Cλ(~s)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Risk
+EQ(~s|~a,o˜) H[P (~o|~s)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ambiguity
.
The expected free energy is the quantity that agents need to optimise in order to remain at steady-state [12], which
means that the states that they visit are distributed according to Cλ (see [11, Appendix B]). The expected free energy
has an important historical pedigree in terms of the quantities that it subsumes, and has been carved in different ways
throughout the literature to showcase its various interpretations [11, 14, 63, 71].
Note that the expected free energy for POMDPs is the expected free energy for MDPs plus an extra term called
ambiguity. This ambiguity term accommodates the uncertainty implicit in partially observed problems. The reason
that this resulting functional is called expected free energy is because it comprises a relative entropy and expected
energy; namely, the first (risk) and second (ambiguity) terms, respectively. By analogy with variational free energy,
the risk corresponds to expected complexity cost and ambiguity corresponds to expected inaccuracy. See Figure 3 for
details.
Crucially, in the limit λ → +∞, and provided that the free energy minimum is reached (18), all of our Bellman
optimality results translate to the POMDP case.
Proposition 4.5 (Reward maximisation on POMDPs). In POMDPs, provided that the free energy minimum is reached
(18), the sequence of actions that minimises expected free energy also maximises expected reward in the limiting case
λ→ +∞, (11):
lim
λ→+∞
arg min
~a
G(~a|o˜) ⊆ arg max
~a
EQ(~s|~a,o˜)[R(~s)].
Furthermore, when λ→ +∞, the action sequences that minimise expected free energy: 1) maximise expected reward,
and 2) maximise H[Q(~s|~a, o˜)]−EQ(~s|at,o˜) H[P (~o|~s)]], that is the entropy of future states minus the (expected) entropy
of outcomes given states.
16
Figure 3: Expected free energy. This figure illustrates the various ways in which minimising expected free energy
may be unpacked. The upper panel casts perception and action as the minimisation of variational and expected free
energy, respectively. Crucially, active inference introduces beliefs over state-action policies that enable a formal de-
scription of planning as inference [17, 41, 42]. In brief, posterior beliefs about hidden states of the world, under
plausible state-action policies, are optimised by minimising a variational free energy bound on log evidence. These
beliefs are then used to evaluate the expected free energy of allowable state-action policies, from which actions can be
selected [71]. Crucially, expected free energy subsumes several special cases that predominate in the psychological,
machine learning, and economics literature. These special cases are disclosed when one removes particular sources
of uncertainty from the implicit optimisation problem. For example, if we ignore prior preferences, then the expected
free energy reduces to information gain [74, 75] or intrinsic motivation [76–78]. This is mathematically equivalent to
expected Bayesian surprise and mutual information that underwrite salience in visual search [79, 80] and the organ-
isation of our visual apparatus [81–84]. If we now reinstate prior preferences but remove risk, we can treat hidden
and observed (sensory) states as isomorphic. This leads to risk sensitive state-action policies in economics [85, 86]
or KL control in engineering [87]. Here, minimising risk corresponds to aligning predicted outcomes to preferred
outcomes. If we then remove ambiguity and relative risk of action (i.e., intrinsic value), we are left with extrinsic
value or expected utility in economics [88] that underwrites reinforcement learning and behavioural psychology [33].
Bayesian formulations of maximising expected utility under uncertainty are also the basis of Bayesian decision the-
ory [89]. Finally, if we only consider a completely unambiguous world with uninformative priors, expected free
energy reduces to the negative entropy of posterior beliefs about the causes of data; in accord with the maximum
entropy principle [61, 62]. The expressions for variational and expected free energy are arranged to illustrate the rela-
tionship between complexity and accuracy, which become risk and ambiguity when considering the consequences of
action. This means that risk-sensitive state-action policy selection minimises expected complexity or computational
cost. Note that here C(o) denotes the preferences over observations derived from the preferences over states. These
are related by the compatibility condition C(s)P (o|s) = C(o)P (s|o).
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Proof of Proposition 4.5.
lim
λ→+∞
arg min
~a
G(~a|o˜)
= lim
λ→+∞
arg min
~a
DKL[Q(~s|~a, o˜)‖Cλ(~s)] + EQ(~s|~a,o˜) H[P (~o|~s)]
= lim
λ→+∞
arg min
~a
−H[Q(~s|~a, o˜)] + EQ(~s|~a,o˜)[− logCλ(~s)] + EQ(~s|~a,o˜) H[P (~o|~s)]
= lim
λ→+∞
arg min
~a
−H[Q(~s|~a, o˜)]− λEQ(~s|~a,o˜)[R(~s)] + EQ(~s|~a,o˜) H[P (~o|~s)] (by (10))
⊆ lim
λ→+∞
arg max
~a
λEQ(~s|~a,o˜)[R(~s)]
= arg max
~a
EQ(~s|~a,o˜)[R(~s)]
The inclusion follows from the fact that as λ→ +∞ a minimiser of the expected free energy has first and foremost to
maximiseEQ(~s|~a,o˜)[R(~s)]. Among such action sequences, the expected free energy minimisers are those that maximise
the entropy of (beliefs about) future states H[Q(~s|~a, o˜)] and resolve ambiguity about future outcomes by minimising
EQ(~s|~a,o˜) H[P (~o|~s)].
We have seen in Proposition 4.5 that among those action sequences that maximise reward, those that are chosen by
active inference maximise
H[Q(~s|~a, o˜)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entropy of future states
− EQ(~s|at,o˜)[H[P (~o|~s)]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entropy of observations given expected future states
which means that they maximise the number of future states that can be visited, and minimise ambiguity by ensuring
that their expected observations carry as much information as possible about their future states, so that these may be
inferred with higher accuracy.
In addition, the schemes of Table 1 & 2 exist in the POMDP setting, (e.g., [10, 11]) and the results of Theorems 4.2
& 4.3 translate to this setting as well, under the condition that the free energy minimum is reached (18). Of course,
when Q(~s|~a, o˜) ≈ P (~s|~a, o˜), the extent to which Proposition 4.5 holds is entirely dependent on the goodness of the
approximation.
In particular, consider an agent in a partially observed environment. The limit λ → +∞, which turns the active
inference agent into full exploitative mode, is only appropriate to gather maximum reward when an environment
has been sufficiently explored, that is when the agent may infer states from observations with high accuracy. More
generally, in environments that need to be learned it is generally preferable to consider finite values of λ.
Remark 4.6 (Explore-exploit). The expected free energy is an objective that subsumes exploratory and exploitative
behaviour [14, 49, 71], and which may offer a principled balance between both imperatives. The relationship between
the exploration-exploitation trade-off afforded by active inference and Bayes-adaptive reinforcement learning [90–94]
remains to be explored.
5 Discussion
In this paper, we have examined the relationship between active inference and dynamic programming. Equivalently, we
have discussed a particular notion of optimality – the Bellman optimality principle of maximising a reward function
– and showed that active inference can be Bellman optimal. Indeed, in the limiting case where the steady-state
or target distribution in active inference concentrates its mass on reward maximising trajectories, active inference
maximises reward. In particular, different levels of Bellman optimal performance can be reached depending on the
particular active inference scheme that is used (see Theorems 4.2 and 4.3). Interestingly, we have also shown that,
in this limiting case, one (sophisticated) active inference scheme reduces to the backward induction algorithm from
dynamic programming (Theorem 4.3). These results highlight important relationships between active inference and
dynamic programming, as well as conditions under which they would and would not be expected to behave differently
(e.g., environments with multiple reward-maximizing trajectories, environments where performance would benefit
from directed exploratory drives, environments with sparse rewards [22], etc.). Yet, it is important to note that exact
differences in the performance of any active inference and RL schemes will likely remain an empirical question, which
will need to be investigated through comparative simulation on different environments. (See Appendix A for a brief
discussion of how reward learning can be practically implemented within active inference schemes and how this relates
to representative reward learning approaches in RL).
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These results build on previous work addressing other points of contact between active inference and RL, which
have to date remained mostly qualitative. For example, a few studies previously demonstrated how active inference
approaches can obtain similar performance to RL models on the mountain-car problem – a benchmark problem in
dynamic programming [24, 29, 95]. More recent simulations have also compared active inference models to represen-
tative model-based and model-free RL algorithms. For example, in the "FrozenLake" OpenAI Gym environment, Sajid
et al. [23] found similar performance in static environments but superior performance by active inference in chang-
ing environments. Another study used a modified expected free energy functional (the free energy of the expected
future [63]) and showed robust performance on several other challenging benchmark RL tasks [22]. Neuroscience-
related work using active inference has also considered the classic interpretation of dopamine responses in the brain
as reward prediction error signals [96] and demonstrated the viability of an alternative perspective – that dopamine
may encode expected confidence in policies that generate preferred outcomes [45, 97, 98]. Our results here may offer
insights about the underlying basis of these previous interpretations.
Beyond RL, an important question in decision neuroscience is whether human decisions in fact maximise reward,
minimise expected free energy or optimise any other objective. This question can be addressed by comparing the
evidence for different models based on their fit to empirical data (e.g., see [46–48]). Current empirical evidence
suggests that humans are not purely reward-maximising agents, and that they also engage in both random and goal-
directed exploration [19, 44, 99] and keep their options open [100]. Note that behavioural evidence favouring models
that do not solely maximise reward within reward maximisation tasks (i.e., where "maximise reward" is the explicit
instruction) is not a contradiction. Rather, exploratory decisions can help to gather more reward in the long run
(e.g., see [18, 23]). Conversely, it is worth noting that some popular RL algorithms also follow a maximum entropy
principle (or RL as inference); i.e., go beyond reward maximisation [101–106]. For example, the model-free Soft
Actor-Critic (SAC) [105] algorithm maximizes both expected reward and entropy, and out-performs other state-of-
the-art algorithms in continuous control environments. This has been shown to be more sample efficient than its
purely reward-maximizing counter-parts [105] and it can solve a broad class of control problems [106]. Formally,
these methods differ from active inference because of the way the target distribution is factorised with conditional
independence between actions and outcomes – such that, unlike active inference, mutual information between them is
not maximised. However, empirical comparisons (to evaluate differences in the agent’s epistemic drive) between these
methods and active inference remains an interesting avenue for research.
When comparing RL and active inference approaches generally, one outstanding issue for active inference is scaling
to more complex problems [21, 22, 25, 28, 30]. This is because planning ahead by evaluating all or many possible
sequences of actions is computationally prohibitive in most real-world situations. To the best of our knowledge, there
are three complementary approaches to solving this problem: 1) employing hierarchical generative models that fac-
torise decisions into multiple levels and reduce the size of the decision tree by orders of magnitude [65], 2) efficiently
searching the decision tree using algorithms like Monte Carlo tree search [27,66,67], and 3) amortising planning using
artificial neural networks [28]. Another issue rests upon the fact that active inference is a Bayesian scheme: it needs to
optimise free energy of a space of generative models. For toy problems, a flexible class of models can easily be crafted
by hand; however, for larger problems, more work needs to be done on plausible algorithms for learning the structure
of generative models themselves [107–109]. This is an important research avenue in generative modelling, called
structure learning, consisting of finding the model with the highest evidence given available data [108,109]. Currently,
a popular approach to solving this problem is the use of generative adversarial networks (GANs) [110–112]; however,
working with GANs in this context is difficult as one then needs to derive appropriate rules to perform inference on the
model. Note that these issues are not unique to active inference. Model-based RL algorithms deal with the same ’com-
binatorial explosion’ when evaluating deep decision trees, which is one primary motivation for developing efficient
model-free RL algorithms. However, other heuristics have also been developed for efficiently searching and pruning
decision trees in model-based RL that can account for human behaviour (e.g., see [64,113]), each with their costs and
benefits. RL may have much to offer active inference in terms of efficient implementation and the identification of
methods to scale to more complex, real-world problems.
Active inference does offer several advantages, however. As we have shown, it affords greater generality when mod-
elling behaviour, and it subsumes the dynamic programming foundations of control and RL on finite horizon tasks.
More specific advantages of active inference include: 1) it can accommodate deep hierarchical models in discrete and
continuous state-spaces [11,65,114], 2) all processes, including perception, planning, learning, and motor control can
be formulated and unified as inference problems [35,36,41,42,115], 3) the expected free energy effectively addresses
the explore-exploit dilemma and confers the agent with artificial curiosity [14,116–118], as opposed to the need to add
ad-hoc information bonus terms [43], and 4) the expected free energy has further unification potential, in that it sub-
sumes many other constructs used within decision-making approaches in the physical, engineering, and life sciences
(see Figure 3, [10, 11]).
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Finally, active inference allows one to move beyond state-action policies that predominate in traditional RL, furnishing
a uniform account of state action policies and sequential policy optimisation. In sequential policy optimisation, one
relaxes the assumption that the same action is optimal given a particular state – and acknowledges that the sequential
order of actions may matter. This is similar to the linearly-solvable MDP formulation presented by Todorov [119,120],
where transition probabilities directly determine actions and an optimal policy specifies transitions that minimise some
divergence cost. This way of approaching policies is perhaps most apparent in terms of exploration and foraging. Put
simply, it is clearly better to explore and then exploit, than to exploit and then explore. Because expected free energy is
a functional of belief states, novelty and exploration become an integral part of optimisation (by reducing uncertainty) –
in contrast with traditional RL schemes that try to optimise a reward function of states. In other words, active inference
agents will always explore until uncertainty is resolved, after which reward maximising, goal-seeking imperatives start
to predominate.
Such advantages should motivate future research to better characterize the tasks in which these properties may offer
the most useful advantages – such as contexts where performance benefits from learning and planning at multiple
temporal scales and from the ability to select policies that resolve both state and parameter uncertainty.
6 Conclusion
In summary, we have shown that on finite horizon MDPs and POMDPs, in the zero-temperature limit and under the
assumption that the preferences of the agent are to maximise reward:
1. active inference selects reward maximising actions that are Bellman optimal. In addition, when there are mul-
tiple reward maximising actions, active inference agents will select the action that maximises the entropy of
future states (a maximal entropy principle) and minimises the ambiguity associated with future observations.
2. We recover the well-known backward induction algorithm from dynamic programming with a particular
(sophisticated) active inference scheme.
Thus, dynamic programming on finite temporal horizons, and discrete space-time, is a limiting case of active inference.
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A Reward learning
Given the focus on relating active inference to the RL objective of maximizing reward, it is worth briefly illustrating
how active inference can learn the reward function from data, and its potential connections to representative RL
approaches. Active inference can learn a reward function, just as any RL algorithm. To do this in practice, one
common approach (e.g., [46]) is to set the preferences to be on observations rather than states, which corresponds to
assuming that the inference is good enough
DKL [Q (~s|~a, o˜) ‖C (~s)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Risk (states)
= DKL [Q (~o|~a, o˜) ‖C (~o)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Risk (outcomes)
+EQ(~o|~a,o˜) [DKL [Q (~s|~o, o˜,~a) ‖P (~s|~o)]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≈0
≈ DKL [Q (~o|~a, o˜) ‖C (~o)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Risk (outcomes)
,
and equality holds whenever the free energy minimum is reached (18). Then one sets the preference distribution such
that the observations designated as rewards are most preferred. In the zero temperature limit (11), preferences only
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assign mass to reward-maximising observations. Note that, when formulated in this way, the reward signal is treated
as sensory data, as opposed to a separate signal from the environment. When one sets allowable actions (controllable
state transitions) to be fully deterministic, such that the selection of each action will transition the agent to a given
state with certainty, the emerging dynamics are such that the agent chooses actions to resolve uncertainty about the
probability of observing reward under each state. Thus, learning the reward probabilities of available actions amounts
to learning the likelihood matrix P (~o|~s) := ot · Ast, where A is a stochastic matrix. This is done by setting a prior a
over A, i.e., a matrix of non-negative components, the columns of which are Dirichlet priors over the columns of A.
The agent then learns by accumulating Dirichlet parameters. Explicitly, at the end of a trial or episode, one sets
a← a +
T∑
τ=0
oτ ⊗Q(sτ |o0:T ) (19)
In (19), Q(sτ |o0:T ) is seen as a vector of probabilities over the state-space S, corresponding to the probability of
having been in one or another state at time the τ after having gathered observations throughout the trial (see [11, 121]
for a derivation of this rule). This rule simply amounts to counting observed state-outcome pairs (state-reward pairs
when the observation modalities correspond to reward).
One should not conflate this approach with the naive update rule consisting of accumulating state-observation counts
in the likelihood matrix
A← A+
T∑
τ=0
oτ ⊗Q(sτ |o0:T ) (20)
and then normalising its columns to sum to one when computing probabilities. The latter simply approximates the
likelihood matrix A by accumulating the number of observed state-outcome pairs. This is distinct from the approach
outlined above, which encodes uncertainty over the matrix A, as a probability distribution over possible distributions
P (ot|st). The agent is initially very unconfident about A, which means that it doesn’t place high probability mass on
any specification of P (ot|st). This uncertainty is gradually resolved by observing state-observation (or state-reward)
pairs. Computationally, it is a general fact of Dirichlet priors that an increase in elements of a, causes the entropy of
P (ot|st) to decrease. As the terms added in (19) are always positive, one choice of distribution P (ot|st) is ultimately
singled out (which best matches available data and prior beliefs). In other words, the likelihood mapping is learned.
Note that, as always when working with partially observed environments, we cannot guarantee that the true likelihood
mapping will be learned in practical applications (see [122] for examples of where, although not in an explicit reward-
learning context, learning the likelihood can be more or less successful in different situations). Learning the true
likelihood fails when the inference over states is inaccurate, e.g., when using too severe mean-field approximations to
the free energy [69, 123, 124], which causes the agent to misinfer states and thereby accumulate Dirichlet parameters
in the wrong place. Intuitively, this amounts to jumping to conclusions too quickly.
Remark A.1. It is also worth noting that reward learning in active inference can be equivalently formulated as learning
transition probabilities P (st+1|st, at). In this alternative setup (e.g., as exemplified in [125]), mappings between
reward states and reward outcomes in A are set as identity matrices, and the agent instead learns the probability
of transitioning to states that deterministically generate preferred (rewarding) observations given the choice of each
policy. Note that, barring any additional sources of state uncertainty in a task, when formulated in this way one could
also use an MDP instead of a POMDP, with a preference distribution instead specified over states and no need to
include any state-outcome uncertainty.
The transition probabilities of the model are learned in a similar fashion as above (19), by accumulating counts on a
Dirichlet prior over P (st+1|st, at). See [11, Appendix A] for details.
It is also worth briefly noting some connections to other common RL algorithms. For example, the naive update
rule consisting of accumulating state-observation counts in the likelihood matrix (20) (i.e., not incorporating Dirichlet
priors) is analogous to off-policy learning in Q-learning. In Q-learning, the objective is to find the best action given
the current observed state. For this, the Q-learning agent accumulates values for state-action pairs with repeated
observation of rewarding/punishing action outcomes – much like state-observation counts. This allows it to learn the
Q-value function that defines a reward maximising policy.
Given the Bayesian, model-based foundations of active inference, more direct links can be made between the active
inference approach to reward learning described above and other Bayesian model-based reinforcement learning ap-
proaches. For such links to be realised, the Bayesian reinforcement learning agent would be required to have a prior
over a prior (e.g., a prior over the reward function prior or transition function prior). One way to implicitly incorpo-
rate this is through Thompson sampling [126–129]. Specifically, Thompson sampling provides a way to maintain an
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appropriate balance between exploiting what is known to maximize immediate performance and accumulating new
information that may improve future performance [127]. It does this by specifying a distribution over a particular
function, that is parameterized by a prior distribution over it. This reduces to optimising dual objectives, reward
maximisation and information gain. This is similar to active inference for reward maximisation (Section 4). Empir-
ically, [23] has demonstrated that a Bayesian model-based reinforcement learning agent using Thompson Sampling
and an active inference agent exhibit similar behaviour when preferences are defined as a function over outcomes.
They also highlighted that, by completely removing the reward signal from the environment, the two agents both se-
lect policies to maximise some sort of information gain. Whilst, not the focus of this paper, future work could further
elucidate the formal links between active inference and Bayesian model-based reinforcement learning schemes.
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